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COMMENTS

REAL ESTATE: PURCHASER'S REMEDIES FOR
DEFICIENCY OF QUANTITY
Since uniqueness in value inheres in all real estate contracts, the
vendor's lack of title to all or a part of the land presents to the purchaser the task of ascertaining those damage and non-damage remedies
under which he may recover for the failure of vendor's title, and a
computation of the various formulas which have been expressed by
the courts in relation to these remedies and their individual components.
In this respect, this study will concentrate on a.) recovery in a rescission action; b.) damages recoverable in a breach of contract action or an
action based upon the tort of misrepresentation; and, c.) specific performance with abatement (compensation).
As will be developed throughout, the purchaser's initial choice of a
particular remedy and his ultimate recovery in monetary amount will
vary depending upon the particular conduct of the vendor in relation
to the reason underlying his deficiency of title. Of paramount importance to the aggrieved purchaser, having selected his remedy, will be the
particular values of the promised realty, of its individual parts, and the
initial contract price. This course of conduct on the part of the aggrieved
purchaser is necessary since the particular remedy and the recovery
afforded by the court for each such remedy may not, in the final analysis, be advantageous to the purchaser. A disaffirming remedy by way
of rescission and return of the purchase price paid may be the ultimate
recovery advantageous to the purchaser.
RESCISSION, ELECTION OF REMEDIES, AND PURCHASER'S LIEN

In the ordinary case, if a vendor has entered into an executory contract for the sale of real estate to a purchaser, a breach by the vendor
will entitle the purchaser to prompt recission and return of any amount
paid on the purchase price.' The breach of an executory contract by
reason of the failure to give marketable title due to a partial or entire
deficiency of quantity will arise only upon the simultaneous arrival of
time for performance on the part of the vendor pursuant to the terms
of the contract itself.
It is ordinarily not essential, to entitle a vendor to enforce a
contract for the sale of land, that at the time he made the contract he should have had title and capacity to convey land, or such
means and right to acquire the same as would have enabled him
to fulfill it on his part; it is sufficient if he is able to convey the
land when, by the terms of the contract or the equity of the case,
he is required to do so, in order to entitle himself to the purchase
price. The mere lack of title in the vendor at the time he entered
1Annot., 102 A.L.R. 852, 864 (1936), supplemented in 134 A.L.R. 1078 (1941).

Accord, Vicker v. O'Connor, 218 Wis. 216, 260 N.W. 426 (1935) ; Wiegman v.
Alexander, 4 Wis. 2d 118, 90 N.W. 2d 273, 91 N.W. 335 (1958).
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into an executory contract for the sale of the land ordinarily does
not entitle the vendee to rescind.2 (Emphasis added.)
As illustrated by Knapp v. Davidson,3 the vendor does not automatically incur, on his part, a breach of contract, by reason of his lack of
ownership at the time of making the contract. He may make a valid
contract for the sale of land where he has only the equitable title, partial title, or a title subject to incumbrances. Similarly, the vendor may
enter into an executory contract for the sale of land where he lacks all
indicia of title. 4 It is when the vendor is unable to perform, by a failure
to convey all or a part of the promised consideration at the time stipulated in the agreement, or at a reasonable time where no time for performance is stated, that he may be compelled to respond to the purchaser in full damages. 5
If, when the time for performance arrived, the defendants were
unable to convey a marketable title, the plaintiff had the same
legal remedies afforded in other similar cases. He then could
rescind the contract and recover the purchase money already paid.
He could have his action at law for damages. If title to only a
portion of the land could be secured, he could have a proportional abatement made from the purchase price.6
Generally, exceptional circumstances will allow a purchaser to rescind a purely executory contract for the sale of land. In Zunker v.
Kuehn,7 plaintiff and defendant agreed to exchange lands, with the
defendant pointing out certain lands having a frontage of 110 feet as
being owned by him. Defendant's subsequent deed covered a strip of
land covering but ninety-nine feet. Upon plaintiff's action for rescission, it was held that the defendants had made false representations of
facts which induced the making of the contract and which representations would be grounds for relief by way of rescission. A similar case
for rescission arises if it is clear that performance on the part of the
vendor will be impossible in the future.8
Case law is to the effect that an action involving rescission or involving the right to rescind a contract and to recover the amount paid on
the purchase price may be an action at law or in equity.5
255 Ai. JUR. Vendor and Purchaser§271, p. 718 (1946).

34 179 Wis. 493, 192 N.W. 75 (1921).
Wiegman v. Alexander, 4 Wis. 2d 118, 90 N.W. 2d 273 (1958).
5 Knapp v. Davidson, 179 Wis. 493, 192 N.W. 75 (1921).
6 Id. at 501, 192 N.W. at 78.
7 113 Wis. 421, 88 N.W. 605 (1902). See Knudson v. George, 157 Wis. 520, 147
N.W. 1003 (1914); Knapp v. Davidson, 179 Wis. 493, 501, 192 N.W. 75, 78
(1921), wherein it is stated that "[sluch a case is presented when there is

fraud which induces the contract ......

s Knapp v. Davidson, supra note 5, at 501, 192 N.W. at 78. It is also stated

therein that "[i]n some cases the insolvency of the vendor has been treated

as a fact proper to be considered."
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One induced by fraud to enter into a contract may take any one
of three courses: (1) Rescind, restore the preexisting status, and
sue at law to recover his payments; (2) offer to restore the status, keep his offer good, sue in equity to rescind and recover his
payments; (3) affirm the contract and sue for the damages resulting from the fraud.10 (Citations omitted.)
An action at law to recover back that which has been paid by the purchaser on a contract, void due to the vendor's fraud, presupposes a
precedent rescission of the contract by an affirmative act of the plaintiffpurchaser." Under (2) above, an action in equity to rescind a contract
supposes the need for equity jurisdiction to effect the ultimate rescission
by way of the actual decree in the action. Such decree will impose upon
the terms of the rescission the return of the amount paid on the contract
2
by the purchaser, as deemed equitable under the circumstances.'
Rescission, being a disaffirming remedy, is thought to be entirely
inconsistent with the affirmative remedies available to an aggrieved purchaser in actions for breach of contract or fraud (misrepresentation).
As stated by Williston:
The doctrine of election of remedies is not peculiar to actions
based upon fraud, but it is, perhaps, most frequently applied or
discussed in connection therewith. The defrauding party has the
alternative but inconsistent rights and remedies of affirmance of
the transaction and recovery of damages for the deceit, or of disaffirmance and restitution where restitution is available. As
pointed out in the Restatement of Contracts, 'a choice between
remedies for an injury must be distinguished from a choice between substantive rights and privileges.' However, the choice of
substantive rights necessarily produces a corresponding limitation in the field of possible remedies. Cases of contracts voidable
for fraud raise both the problems of election between substantive
rights and between inconsistent remedies. The traditional view
has been that the choice between substantive legal relations-between contract or no contract-is made by mere manifestation of
election, whether that be simply by the injured party's conduct in
other ways, or by his
bringing suit for rescission or action for
13
damages for deceit.
In Bischoff v. Hustisford State Bank,' 4 plaintiff's complaint first
stated a cause of action for the rescission of the contract due to fraud.
In the alternative, plaintiff pleaded a second cause of action to recover
9

Annot., 95 A.L.R. 1000 (1935).

10 Morse Chain Co. v. T. W. Meiklejohn, Inc., 237 Wis. 383, 388, 296 N.,W. 106,

109 (1941).

"Ludington v. Patton, 111 Wis. 208, 86 N.W. 571 (1901).
12 Ibid.
13 5 WIuSTON, CONTRACrS §1528 (rev. ed. 1937); See Annot., 6 A.L.R. 2d 15

(1949).

'-

195 Wis. 312, 218 N.W. 353 (1928). Accord., Beers v. Atlas Assurance Co.,

231 Wis. 361, 369, 285 N.W. 794, 798 (1939).
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damages for fraud. The court held that the doctrine of election of remedies did not apply and that the complaint was proper, since if the plaintiff had proceeded to trial on the first cause of action based upon rescission, had been unsuccessful, he would not have been barred from suing
on the breach of contract action.
The second action would not have been an attempt to relitigate
the issues presented in the first cause of action. He would have
sought recovery in the second cause of action upon an entirely
different ground than the recovery sought in the first cause of
action. It has been said that the doctrine of election of remedies
is a harsh, and now largely obsolete, rule, the scope of which
should not be extended ....

While the causes of action joined in

this case would, as already pointed out, rest upon an inconsistent
state of facts, the remedy sought in one is no substitute for the
remedy sought in the other. A suit in the first instance upon the
contract for damages for breach would no doubt be an affirmance
of it, which would preclude an action for rescission, but the reverse is not true. 15
The rationale of the Bischoff case has been further explained in
Schlotthauer v. Krenzelok,1 6 wherein plaintiff, after commencing an
action for rescission sold the farm and personalty received under the
contract, was refused permission to amend his complaint to state a cause
of action for damages for fraud and deceit. Upon plaintiff's instituting
a new suit, the defendant pleaded that plaintiff had made a prior election of remedies which precluded the prosecution of the damages action. The county court dismissed the complaint upon a finding of a
"binding election." Upon appeal, faced with this "binding election of
remedies at time of commencement of the suit" rationale, the Supreme
Court stated that: "The more recent cases . . . raise grave doubt as to

whether Wisconsin has not completely abandoned the holding of the
earlier cases that a conclusive election of remedies is made as of the
time of the commencement of the action."' 17 Also, it is stated that "[t]he
cases . . . lay down the principle that if the plaintiff has mistaken his

remedy then there has been no binding election by the commencement
of suit that precludes him from thereafter pursuing the proper remedy
to judgment. ' s
The Schlotthauer decision, while rejecting the election of remedies
principle, has reached a like result in the theory of affirming and disaffirming substantive rights. As stated by the court, in holding that
plaintiff's cause of action for fraud was not barred by commencement
of a prior action in equity for rescission:
15 Id. at 320, 218 N.W. at 357.
16 274 Wis. 1, 79 N.W. 2d 76 (1956).
17 1d. at 3, 79 N.W. 2d at 78.
isIbid.

1966]

COMMENTS

The reason why a suit at law to recover damages for fraud bars
a subsequent suit for rescission is not because there has been an
election of inconsistent remedies, but rather that the act of instituting an action at law for damages recognizes the existence
of the contract and affirms it. Once having been so affirmed, the
right to rescind is forever lost. Such act is no different than any
other act indicating an affirmance of the contract, such as proceeding with the performance of the contract after discovery of
the fraud, or disposing of some of the property acquired under
the contract, thus putting it beyond the power of the defrauded
party to rescind and place the parties in status quo. 9
As a general rule, where the purchaser is entitled to rescind his contract due to a breach by the vendor and so elects to rescind, a lien arises
to secure the quasi-contractual right of the purchaser to recover the
payments made on the contract price. 20 Weidner v.Hyland,21 proceeding upon a different rationale as to time but yielding a like result, held
on rehearing that the lien attached when payment was made on the purchase price and remained whenever the right to recover the payment
existed by reason of the vendor's default in performance.
As set forth in Miswald-Wilde Co. v. Armory Realty Co.,2 2 on re-

hearing, the lien is limited to recovery of the payments made on the
contract, with interest thereon. This opinion goes on to state that the
lien will not be extended to cover or secure the aggrieved purchaser's
possible loss of profits on the purchase of the land, suffered by reason
of the vendor's breach of contract.
CONTRAcT DAMAGES

Flureau z. Thornhill,23 decided in England in 1775, is credited with
the formulation of the so-called "out-of-pocket" (good faith) rule as to
the recovery of damages for the vendor's breach of contract to convey
a marketable title. Flureau bought a rent issuing from a leasehold and
paid a sum certain as a deposit on his purchase. Upon examination of
the title, it was found to be unmarketable and the vendor, Thornhill,
offered to return the deposit with interest and costs. Flureau refused,
demanding a further sum by way of damages for the loss of bargain
on his contemplated purchase. The jury having awarded damages for
this loss of bargain, and the vendor having appealed for a new trial, it
was held that:
... [TJhe verdict [was] wrong in point of law. Upon a contract
for a purchase, if the title proves bad, and the vendor is (without
Id. at 5, 79 N.W.2d at 78.
17 MARQ. L. Rv. 303, 304 (1932-33). See Annot., 45 A.L.R. 352 (1926).
21216 Wis. 12, 19, 255 N.W. 134, 256 N.W. 244, 245 (1934). See Wis. STATS.
§§235.45 and 235.53, (1963), whereby a lien arises upon the recording of a
contract for the sale of land.
22210 Wis. 53, 71, 243 N.W. 492, 244 N.W. 589, 246 N.W. 305, 306 (1933).
23 2 W. Bl. 1078, 96 Eng. Rep. 635 (1776).
'9

20
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fault) incapable of making a good one, I do not think that the
purchaser can be entitled to any damages for the 2fancied
good4
ness of the bargain, which he supposes he has lost.

This out-of-pocket (good faith) rule yields the recovery of an amount
similar to that for rescission, the amount the purchaser has paid on the
contract.
The English doctrine is followed with slight qualification in
a few American states. In most American cases, however, which
purport to follow the English authorities, the rule restricting
damages to those appropriate for rescission is clearly limited
to
25
cases where the vendor has not been guilty of bad faith.
In McFarlanev. Dixon,26 defendants agreed to sell plaintiff two lots
for a total price of $2000. The contract referred to the two lots as belonging to one McIntryre, deceased. The contract went on to state that
the vendor-defendants were the residuary legatees and devisees under
McIntryre's will. The lots had been included in Mclntryre's inventory,
but in effect one of the lots belonged to another party and did not descend to the vendor-defendants. In affirming the lower court's finding,
that there was, as a matter of law, no element of tortious conduct on the
part of the defendants, it was stated that:
The defendants believed that they had the right to make the contract as the residuary legatees under the will, and that they could
convey good title ....

[ w] ere circumstances well adapted to raise

the belief
that they were within their rights in making the contract.27 [Emphasis added.]
The cases we have cited are in line with the leading case decided in England in 1775, Flureau v. Thornhill, . . . which has

been much discussed by the courts and text-writers. Counsel for
appellant do not content that the rule adopted in that case and
by this court should be changed, but that it should not be applied
in the present case, because, it is argued, defendants should have
known the state of the title of the land they bargained to sell.28
As the above quotation points out, Wisconsin is committed to the rule
of Flureau v. Thornhill where the vendor believed that he had a right
to enter into a contract for the sale of the promised quantity of land.
Where the vendor's title to all or a part of the promised consideration fails, the question of whether the purchaser will be able to recover
24

Ibid.

NN¥1LLISTON,
CONTRACTS §1399, p. 3904 (rev. ed. 1937). Accord., Annot., 48
A.L.R. 12 (1927); 5A CORBIN, CONTRACTS §1160, p. 193 (1964); Dempsey v.
Staufer, 197 F. Supp. 260 (E.D. Pa. 1961) ; Mokar Properties Corp. v. Hall,
6 App. Div. 2d 536, 179 N.Y.S. 2d 814 (1st Dep't. 1958).
26 176 Wis. 652, 187 N.W. 671 (1922).
27 Id. at 654, 187 N.W. at 672.
28 Id. at 657, 187 N.W. at 673.
25

5
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damages greater than the amount paid on the purchase price will depend
upon the particular jurisdiction's decisions relating to the "good faithbad faith" conduct of the vendor.
Under the rule generally prevailing in the United States, however... the only rule defensible on principle, allowing the purchaser the difference between so much of the contract price as is
unpaid and the market value of the land, is applied in every case
where the vendor breaks his contract without legal excuse....
Where the purchaser makes total default, the general rule
both in England and the United States allows recovery of the
difference between the contract price and the market value as in
the case of personal property.2 9 [Emphasis added.]
This measure of contract damages is traditionally known as the "benefitof-bargain" (bad faith) rule.30
The 1904 case of Arentsen v. Moreland,31 sets forth the circumstances which will equal bad faith conduct on the part of a vendor-defendant. A vendor, who contracts to convey title to lands which he
knows he does not own, in which case he would lack the "belief of a
right to convey" as illustrated by McFarlane, is liable for the benefitof-bargain measure of contract damages if he is unable to acquire title
3 2
prior to the time for performance. As stated in Lammen v. Danaher,
"having agreed to do what he had no right to do, taking his chances
upon being able to acquire such right, he is guilty of a species of bad
faith. . .

."

Similarly, where the vendor agrees with the plaintiff-pur-

chaser to convey certain lands, but conveys in the interim to another,
the vendor will be liable for benefit-of-bargain damages. 33 Upon the
right of the purchaser to maintain a breach of contract action with a
measure of benefit-of-bargain damages where the vendor declares, prior
to the time for conveying, that he will not perform, it has been stated:
The majority rule is that where the vendor in an executory contract for the sale of land declares positively, prior to the time set
for performance on his part, that he will not perform the contract
at all, the vendee may, if he so elects, treat the contract as immediately breached
in omnibus, and thereupon maintain an action
34
for damages.

As previously noted, the purchaser, under the good faith measure
5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §1399, p. 3906 (rev. ed. 1937) ; 5A CORBIN, CONTRACTS
§1160, p. 193 (1964).
30 Lommen v. Danaher, 165 Wis. 15, 161 N.W. 14 (1917).
31 122 Wis. 167, 99 N.W. 790 (1904).
32 165 Wis. 15, 22, 161 N.W. 14, 17 (1917).
33 122 Wis. 167, 176-182, 99 N.W. 790, 793-796 (1904). See Annot., 90 A.L.R.
337 (1934); Anderson v. Tri-State Home Improvement Co., 268 Wis. 455,
462, 67 N.W. 2d 853, 858, 68 N.W. 2d 705 (1955) wherein it was stated that
if the vendor makes promises and at the time of making them he has a
present intent not to perform, the promises may amount to fraudulent representations.
34 Annot., 102 A.L.R. 1082, 1083 (1936).
29
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of damages rule in an action on the breach of contract, will be able to
recover the money paid on account of the purchase price, together with
the reasonable expenses incurred, and interest.35 In the case of a bad
faith breach of contract by the vendor wherein the vendor knows at
the time of conveying that he lacks title, the purchaser will recover
his loss of bargain on the contract. This recovery will be computed as
the fair market value of the promised consideration (land) less the
amount still owing on the agreed contract price.S&
It is readily apparent that the purchaser will be concerned with the
measure of recovery formula for breach of contract damages in two
particular aspects. First, the purchaser will have to prove that the vendor's conduct concerning his contracting to convey that which he does
not own in whole or in part was "bad faith" conduct on his part. The
second, and most important, aspect of the purchaser's damages suit for
breach of contract will be the actual amounts paid and bargained for
(contracted) by the vendor and purchaser. In this respect, the purchaser
will have to have originally contracted for the benefit of the bargain by
agreeing to pay less than the fair market value of the promised quantity
of land. Where the purchaser has not contracted for the benefit of the
bargain, the recovery will be limited to the return of the purchase price
paid, either by way of an action for breach of the contract or for rescission.
By way of summary on the measure of damages recoverable under
either the out-of-pocket or benefit-of-bargain rule, the rules constituting
the typical actionable conduct on the part of the vendor are best stated
by Chief Justice Cooley, in Hammond v. Hannin:37
The principle underlying these cases is that if a party enters
into a contract to sell, knowing that he cannot make a title, he is
remitted to his general liability, and the exception introduced by
Flureau v. Thornhill does not apply. So if a person undertakes
that a third party shall convey, and is unable to fulfill his contract, the authorities are that he shall pay full damages. Such
contracts are speculative in character, and the party giving them
understands the risk he assumes when the covenant is entered
into....
There are numerous cases which decide that if the vendor
acts in bad faith-as if, having title he refuses to convey or disables himself from conveying, the proper measure of damages is
the value of the land at the time of the breach: the rule in such
case being the same in relation to real as to personal property....
And the cases before referred to, in which the party undertook to
sell that which he did not own and knew he could not control,
3 See cases collected in 55 A~i. Jua. Vendor and Purchaser§529, p. 923 (1946).
3 Annot., 48 A.L.R. 12 (1927).
3721 Mich. 374, 386, 4 Am. Rep. 490, 494 (1870).

COMMENTS
may also ....

be considered as involving a degree of bad faith,

and generally been so regarded by the courts.
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE WITH ABATEMENT

The English case of Cleaton v. Gower,38 decided in 1674, dealt with
the formulation of another remedy available to an aggrieved purchaser
in those situations where a part of the promised consideration is unavailable. Cleaton agreed with one Gower, vendor-defendant, to open
certain mines belonging to Gower and the latter was to furnish cordwood for that purpose at rates specified in the agreement. Cleaton entered into performance of the agreement and paid for the cordwood
at the rate specified. Cleaton thereafter demanded execution of the agreement in specie, whereupon the defendant claimed that he was only a
life tenant and therefore unable to execute the agreement. The court decreed that the defendant should execute the agreement in specie as far
as capable of his doing and likewise should satisfy the plaintiff with
such damages as he has sustained in not enjoying the premises. 39
Specific performance with abatement (compensation) is an attempt
to preserve the rights of both the purchaser and the vendor under the
original contract and will be applied by the courts in aid of a purchaser
who is willing and desirous to take the partial interest which the vendor
is able to convey, especially where the purchaser is the party calling
upon the court for this particular form of relief. 40 As stated by the Wisconsin court, "'If, when the time for performance arrived, the defendants were unable to convey a marketable title, the plaintiff . .. [ilf
title to only a portion of the land could be secured, ....
41

could have a

proportional abatement of the purchase price.' "
Of historical and theoretical import is both the relationship and the
difference between damages in a breach of contract action and of specific performance with abatement.
'Compensation,' on the other hand, using the word in its special
and restricted meaning, is an ordinary and constant incident of
the remedy of specific performance, a part of the general course
of administering the doctrines of equity, and is to be regarded,
not as an independent and separate award of damages, but rather
as a condition upon which relief of specific performance is
granted at all, or as a modification of that relief, so that it may be
adapted to the circumstances of the case and the equities of the
parties. Although the amount of compensation may be ascertained
38
23 Eng. Rep. 90 (1674). [Rep. Temp. Finch, 165,J.
39
Annot., 81 A.L.R. 900 (1932) ; Annot., 148 A.L.R. 563 (1944) ; RESTATEMENT,
CONTRACrS §360 (1932).
0
4 POMEROY, SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACTS §§434-442 (3d ed. 1926);
FRIEDMIAN,

1963).

CONTRACTS AND CONVEYANCES

OF REAL PROPERTY,

41 Wiegman v. Alexander, 4 Wis. 2d 118, 127,

353 (1957).

§12.2 (2d ed.

90 N.W. 2d 273, 279, 91 N.W. 2d
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upon somewhat the same basis as that upon which damages would
be assessed for the same loss, yet the motives and principles upon
which compensation is allowed are wholly different from those
upon which damages are awarded.42
This relationship is implied in McFarlane v. Dixon,4 3 previously
discussed on the minority exception Flureau v. Thornhill, as to a good
faith belief in the right to title on the part of the vendor at the time
of contracting. The agreed contract price was $2000 for the two lots,
with the individual values of the lots being $2200 at the time of breach.
The court, after noting that the purchaser was asking for the entirely
inconsistent remedy of specific performance with abatement, 4 granted
purchaser such remedy. In computing the amount of the abatement, the
court relied upon the damages formula announced in Messer v. Oestreich,45 the wording of which was corrected in the later case of Semple
v. Whorton.46
In light of these authorities, and others which might be cited,
and in the absence of fraud, we conclude that, where the title fails
to only a part of the land conveyed, the grantee may recover in an
action on the covenants of seizin and right to convey, or upon
an agreement to convey, such fractional part of the whole consideration paid as the value at the time of the purchase of the
piece to which title fails bears to the value of the whole piece
purchased, and interest thereon during the time he has been deprived of the use of such fractional part, but not exceeding six
years.4 7 [Emphasis added.]

As quoted, this damage and abatement formula is ambiguous in that the
"whole piece purchased" is susceptible of two interpretations. It could
be construed to apply to the value of the piece purchased after the
abatement of the missing piece, or it could, and is, meant to relate to the
value of the whole piece which was included within the original promise
of the vendor. A clear and unambiguous definition of this formula is
best stated in Hepler v. Atts,48 another damages case.
The measure of the disappointed buyer's damages in such
cases is that fractional part of the purchase price which represents the relative value which the part to which title is defective
bears to the whole tract the seller purported to convey ....

Repre-

sented mathematically, if VP represents the value of the 25 acres
to which title was found by the jury to be defective and VW
represents the value of the whole 125 acre tract which the dece42 POMEROY, SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACTS §436, p. 902 (3d ed. 1926).
See 81 C. J. S. Specific Performance §162 (1953) ; 49 Aimi. JUR. Specific Performance §174 (1943).
Wis. 652, 187 N.W. 671 (1922).
441d. at 656, 187 N.W. at 672.
4552 Wis. 684, 10 N.W. 6 (1881).
4668 Wis. 626, 32 N.W. 690 (1887).
47 Id. at 636, 32 N.W. at 693.
48201 Pa. Super 236, 192 A. 2d 138 (1963).
43176
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dent purported to convey, the formula for ascertaining the damages recoverable in this case is VP
v
x [the contract price].
Applied to the McFarlanevalues, the measure of amount to be abated
would be $2,200 x $2,000 = $1000. Actually the court's opinion states

$4,400

that the purchaser would receive the individual lot for a payment of
$800. Therefore, assuming the $1000 to be what the purchaser would
be obligated to pay under the McFarlane facts, where there is a good
faith-legal excuse breach of contract by the vendor, the measure of
abatement is actually a proration of the original contract price.
There has been some controversy as to whether the damages
are to be assessed upon the basis of the value of the land lost, or
such proportion of the consideration as the value of the land lost
bears to the value of the entire land purported to have been conveyed. In this respect it has been pointed out that the actual value
of the land lost is not the true measure of damages. The damages
recoverable are relative or comparative, the standard
being the
50
consideration or price paid for the whole tract.

The court, in McFarlane,after citing adherence to the good faith exception of Flureau v. Thornhill,5 cited Arentsen v. Moreland,.2 which
limits the application of the good faith recovery rule. Arentsen, previously digested herein, holds the vendor liable for benefit-of-bargain
damages where he agrees to convey knowing he has no right to title or
where he sells to another after contracting with the plaintiff-puichaser.
Therefore, it might be implied that, where the vendor is guilty of bad
faith, the amount of abatement from the contract price will be the actual
value of the deficient part.
If this amount should correspond with the diminution of value
attributable to the defect the purchaser would in effect recover
pro tanto for his loss of bargain.53
While, in the case of deficiency in quantity, the court has recognized the propriety of deducting a sum which bears the same proportion to the whole piece as the amount of land lacking bears to
to the whole area of land agreed to be conveyed, in some cases
the value of the land lose with relation to the value of the whole
tract has been used as a basis for a ratable deduction, and there
is authority for the view that the value of the property which
cannot be conveyed may be considered separately in determining
the amount of the deduction or compensation. 4
490 Id., 192 A. 2d at 140.

S Annot., 61 A.L.R. 10, 90 (1929), Supplemented in 100 A.L.R. 1194 (1936). See
Annot., 148 A.L.R. 563 (1944).
51 McFarlane v. Dixon, 176 Wis. 652, 657, 187 N.W. 671, 673 (1922).
52 122 Wis. 167, 99 N.W. 790 (1904).
53 FRIEDMAN, CONTRACTS AND CONVEYANCES OF REAL PROPERTY §12.2, p. 525 (2d ed.
1963). Accord., 5A CoRBiN. CONTRACTS §1160, p. 193 (1964).
54 81 C. J. S. Specific Performance §162, p. 177 (1953). See Milton Realty Co.
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The following illustrations are intended to present the relative advantage or disadvantage to the purchaser of both the good faith and bad
faith abatement formulas under situations of fluctuating values in both
the whole consideration promised and the deficient part.
Illustration A
Assume a purchaser agrees to acquire a vendor's land at a contract
price (CP) of $100,000, based upon an expected conveyance of 200
acres at a value of $500 per acre. Further, assume that, at the time for
performance, vendor is able to furnish title to but 180 acres, and that
at the time of this breach the value per acre is $550, the value of the
promised land therefore being $110,000. The value of the part (VP)
would then be $11,000 (20 acres at $550.)
Bad Faith Abatement
Good Faith Abatement
(CP) $100,000
(VP) $ 11,000
(VP) - 11,000
(VW) $110,000 x (CP) 100,000 = $10,000

$ 89,000
(CP) $100,000
- 10,000

$ 90,000
The good faith-proportional abatement formula results in the purchaser expending $90,000 for acreage with a value of $99,000, while
under the bad faith formula the purchaser parts with $89,000 for land
valued at $99,000. Here, the value of the parts being equal to the
whole, the purchaser under the bad faith rationale recoups an additional
$1,000 in compensation.
IllustrationB
Assume a second contract, wherein the value of the parts is not
equal to the whole. For example, a contract price of $10,000, for land
worth $12,000 as a whole but individually worth $3,000 as to the deficient part and $6,000 as to the part vendor has title.
Good Faith Abatement
Bad Faith Abatement
(VP) $ 3,000
(CP) $10,000
- 3,000
(VP)
(VW) $12,000 X (CP) $10,000=$2,500
$ 7,000
(CP) $10,000
- 2,500

$ 7,500
Thus, purchaser will pay either $7,500 or $7,000 for land worth $6,000.
Besides paying above the actual value of the land received under either
formula, as the value of the part to which title fails increases in value
(say either $4,000 or $6,000 the bad faith formula will result in the
v. Wilson, 214 Ala. 143, 107 So. 92 (1926); Foster v. Klinger, 92 Ind. App.
700, 175 N.E. 136 (1931).
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greater benefit to the purchaser in comparison to the good faith abatement formula.
IllustrationC
Assume circumstances where the fair market value of the promised
land is lower in amount than the agreed contract price; the contract
price of $100,000 being based upon 200 acres with an agreed value of
$500 per acre. The vendor is able to furnish marketable title to but 180
acres, with the fair market value at the time of breach being $450 per
acre.
Good FaithFormula
Bad FaithFormula
(VP) $ 9,000
(CP) $100,000
(VW) $ 90,000 ( (CP) $100,000=910,000
(VP) - 9,000
(CP) $100,000
$ 91,000
- 10,000

$ 90,000
Where the fair market value of the promised consideration is less than
the original contract price, the purchaser would expend either $90,000
or $91,000 for land worth $81,000. Under these circumstances, the
vendor actually retains the benefit of the bargain, and in greater proportion where he is guilty of bad faith.
Also, where the value of the parts is not equal to the whole, and
where the fair market value of the promised consideration is less than
the original contract price, the good faith abatement formula results
in a less severe loss of the bargain, although both abatements remain
advantageous to the vendor. Under these circumstances the purchaser
should be cautioned to consider the advantage of a rescission action
yielding a return of the purchase price paid thereon.
FALSE REPRESENTATION

It may be possible for the purchaser to maintain an action based
upon false representation (misrepresentation) if the vendor induces
such purchaser "to purchase land by making materially false representations as to its quality or quantity under circumstances which entitle
the vendee to rely thereon. .

. ."55

Of course, the question of whether

there was in fact a material misrepresentation upon which to base the
purchaser's reliance is always paramount.
Doubtless, the question whether a given title is a good title
or not is a question of opinion merely; but a direct representation
made by one man to another that he has a free title to certain
described real estate cannot be considered as a mere legal opinion. The circumstances may show, perhaps, that it was a mere
opinion as to the validity of a certain title, and was so understood by the parties, in which case, of course, fraud cannot be
5 Knudson v. George, 157 Wis. 520, 522, 147 N.W.1003, 1004 (1914).
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predicated upon it; but, on the other hand, the circumstances
under which it was given may demonstrate that it was intended
and understood as a representation of a fact, and if such is the
case, and it was relied upon to the damage of the other party,
it becomes an actionable fraud.56
The term fraud, as used in cases where the vendor represents as a
fact that the land is of a particular quantity, has several interpretations.
In Neas v. Siemens,57 the vendor-plaintiff brought an action for foreclosure on a land contract. Defendant-purchaser answered and interposed a counterclaim for damages, alleging that the vendor plaintiff
fraudulently represented the number of tillable acres contained within
the limits of the farm, the condition of certain cattle and machinery,
and the amount of insurance protection carried by the vendor on the
farm buildings. Upon the question of what constituted false representations, it was stated that "[t]he rule is that in a tort action based upon
false representations in the sale of property it is unnecessary to show
that the representations were made with fraudulent intent."58 However,
in Knudson v. George,59 it was held that where a vendor induces another to purchase land by making materially false representations, the
purchaser may affirm the sale and recover the "damages which he sustains ....

And this he may do whether the representations were made

fraudulently or merely negligently." 60
On the other hand, several cases have applied a different interpretation to the term false representation, with the supposed majority rule
being:
'To be actionable the false representation must consist first,
of a statement of fact which is untrue; second, that it was made
with intent to defraud and for the purpose of inducing the other
party to act upon it; third, that he did in fact rely on it and was
induced thereby to act, to his injury or damage.' 6 1 [Emphasis

added]
As discussed by Prosser, 62 there has been a good deal of overlapping
between the theories of deceit and misrepresentation, and this increases
with the indiscriminate use of the term "fraud." Thus, the term misrepresentation is broader than the action for deceit itself, and liability
in damages for misrepresentation often falls within three familiar
divisions; based upon intent to deceive, upon negligence, or upon a
56

Hurlbert v. T. D. Kellogg Lumber & Mfg. Co., 115 Wis. 225, 227, 91 N.W.

57

10 Wis. 2d 47, 102 N.W. 2d 259 (1960).

673, 674 (1902). See, Annot., 33 A.L.R. 853 (1924).

58 Id. at 55, 102 N.W. 2d at 263.
59 157 Wis. 520, 147 N.W. 1003 (1914).

6o1d. at 522, 147 N.W. at 1004.
61

Benz v. Zobel, 255 Wis. 542, 555, 39 N.W. 2d 713, 719 (1949). Accord., Jandrt

62

PRossER,

v. Milwaukee Auto. Ins. Co., 255 Wis. 618, 39 N.W. 698 (1949); First National Bank in Oshkosh v. Scieszinski, 25 Wis. 2d 569, 131 N.W. 2d 308 (1964).
LAW OF TORTS

§100, pp. 698-99 (3d ed. 1964).

19661

COMMENTS

policy requiring the defendant to be strictly responsible for his statements.
The rules and formulas for recovery by a defrauded purchaser are
commonly referred to as benefit-of-bargain and out-of-pocket, yet the
elements of the formula of each are entirely different from those re63
covery formulas discussed previously under the Flureau v. Thornhl1
rationale.
The courts of this country are divided as to the proper rule
of damages to be applied in actions for fraudulent representations
inducing a contract. .

.

. The majority of jurisdictions have

adopted the 'benefit-of-bargain' rule under which the measure
of damages is the difference between the value of the property
as it was when purchased and what it would have been if it had
been as represented. A substantial minority apply the 'out-ofpocket' rule under which the measure of damages is the difference between the price paid for the property [the contract price]
and its value when purchased. Wisconsin is committed to the
majority of 'benefit-of-bargain' rule.6 4 [Emphasis added]
Under the benefit-of-bargin rule the price paid by the purchaser is
relevant evidence on the issue of the value of the property if it had
been as represented.

65

A fraudulent representation recovery, based upon a tort theory and
allowing recovery for the benefit of the bargain, is the general measure
of recovery of damages for a contract action based upon a breach of
warranty of quality.6 It is also apparent that not all cases of fraudulent
representations amount to warranties. 67 This inconsistency, however,
has resulted in (1) various critcisms of the out-of-pocket rule which
has been adopted by the English courts and a minority of American
courts in deceit actions,"s and (2) justifications for the retention of
the majority benefit-of-bargain rule within the tort action of misrepresentation. As stated by Sutherland:
'[T]o allow the plaintiff only the difference between the real
value of the property and the price which he was induced to pay
for it would be to make any advantage lawfully secured to the
innocent purchaser in the original bargain inure to the wrongdoer; and, in proportion as the original price was low, would
afford a protection to the party who had broken, at the expense
of the party who was ready to abide by, the terms of the contract.'6 9
632 W. B1. 1078, 96 Eng. Rep.

635 (1776).

Anderson v. Tri-State Home Improvement Co., 268 Wis. 455, 464, 67 N.W.
2d 853, 859, 68 N.W. 2d 705 (1955). See Annot., 124 A.L.R. 37 (1940).
65 Id. at 464, 67 N.W. 2d at 859.
66 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACrS §1391, p. 3883 (rev. ed. 1937).
67 Id. at §1392, p. 3887.
68 PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS §105, p. 750 (3d ed. 1964).
69 SUTHERLAND, DAMAGES §1172 (4th ed. 1916).
64
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Prosser sets for the following discussion:
As a matter of the strict logic of the form of action, the first
of these two rules [out-of-pocket] is more consistent with the
purpose of tort remedies, which is to compensate the plaintiff
for a loss sustained, rather than to give him the benefit of any
On the other hand, it is urged in supcontractual bargain ....
port of the majority rule that the form of the action should be
of little importance, that in an action in the form of tort for
breach of warranty the plaintiff is given the benefit of his bargain and the addition of an allegation of intent to deceive should
certainly not decrease his recovery, and that in many cases the
out-of-pocket measure will permit the fraudulent defendant to
escape all liability and have a chance to profit by the transacaction if he can get away with it.70
In Har-weger v. Wilcox,71 plaintiff's action was for tort damages
based upon fraudulent representations in relation to their purchase of
a farm represented to contain 115 tillable acres, and which in fact contained but from 69 to 77 acres. Plaintiff's expert witness testified that
the actual value of the land was $19,000. Defendant's expert testified
that the land was worth $36,000 as represented and as to actual value.
The jury found that the value of the farm as represented was $36,000,
with an actual value of $26,000. On appeal, a trial court verdict of
$7,250 was held not supportable under the under the benefit-of-bargain
rule where plaintiff's expert was not allowed to testify as to the value
of the land as represented by the defendants. The court stated that:
"The trial court correctly stated that Wisconsin is committed to the
benefit-of-bargain rule. However, in fraud cases evidence relating to
out-of-pocket damages should be admitted as relevant. ' 7" The case was
remanded for a determination by plaintiff's expert as to the value as
represented by defendants.
The dissenting opinion proposed the adoption of flexibility into the
measure of damages in misrepresentation cases. "The defrauded plaintiff should have the option of recovering either under the "benefit-ofbargain' rule or the 'out-of-pocket rule. In fraud cases, the purpose is
to wholly indemnify the injured party."73 Cited in the dissenting opinion
is a leading Oregon case, Selam v. Shirley,7 4 which has, to date, given
the most careful consideration to the subject of what damages plaintiff
should recover in a misrepresentation case. It has been stated, by
Prosser, that Selam v. Shirley has reduced the matter of fraudulent
representation recoveries to four workable rules.
1. If the defrauded party is content with the recovery of only
70

PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS §105, p.

751 (3d ed. 1964).

16 Wis. 2d 526, 114 N.W. 2d 818 (1962).
7 Id. at 534, 114 N.W. 2d at 822.
73Ibid., 114 N.W. 2d at 823.
74 161 Ore. 582, 85 P. 2d 384 (1938), 91 P. 2d 312 (1939).
71
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the amount he has actually lost, his damages will always be
measured under that rule.
2. If the fraudulent transaction also amounted to a warranty,
he may recover for loss of the bargain, because a fraud accompanied by a broken promise should cost the wrongdoer as much
as the breach of promise alone.
3. Where the circumstances disclosed by the proof are so
vague as to cast virtually no light upon the value of the property
had it conformed to the representations, damages will be awarded equal to the loss sustained, and
4. Where the damages under the benefit-of-bargain rule are
proved with reasonable certainty, that rule will be employed. 75
As for specific performance with abatement, in misrepresentation
circumstances, it has been stated that this particular remedy will not
not be available to the aggrieved purchaser where the false representations are collateral to the contract.7 6 The purchaser's remedy in such a
case is rescission or damages for misrepresentation.
On the other hand, the proportional abatement formula set forth in
McFarlane v. Dixon77 varies from the one previously quoted in this
article in that the "in the absence of fraud" terminology was deleted.
Of particular interest is the fact that the McFarlane court, in support
of the formula it had set forth, cited Darlington v. J. L. Gates Land
Co.,7 8 wherein the following statement appears:
True, as stated by counsel for defendant, if the action is
ex dilicto then the measure of damages is the difference between
the market value of the land as it was and the market value as it
would have been had it been as represented, while if the action
is ex contractu it would be such fractional part of the whole
consideration paid as the value of the timber [the piece to which
title failed] bore to the whole purchase price, [value of the whole
piece purchased]....
One might argue that specific performance with abatement would be
available where the vendor misrepresented the quantity of land contracted for. If so, it would appear to be limited to a specific performance
action with a proration of the contract price. Notwithstanding the
possibility of specific performance with abatement in misrepresentation
cases, Benz v. Zobel79 is indicative of a theoretical objection to such an
action where the contract is executory in nature:
There is a well established prinicple of law that a party
defrauded may retain what he has received, stand to his bar7 PRossER, LAW OF TORTS §105, p. 752
7649 Am. JUR. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE

(3d ed. 1964).
§174, p. 199 (1943).
Wis. 652, 657, 187 N.W. 671, 672 (1922).
Wis. 461, 463, 138 N.W. 72, 73, 139 N.W. 447 (1913). See Doctor v. Furch,
76 Wis. 153, 170, 44 N.W. 648, 652 N.W. 826 (1890) wherein the possibility
of abatement is mentioned where fraud or mistake is present.
79255 Wis. 542, 549, 39 N.W. 2d 713, 716 (1949).

77 176
78151
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gain, and recover for the loss caused him by the fraud. However,
he cannot maintain an action for the original wrong practiced on
him where with full knowledge of all the material facts he does
an act which indicates his intention to stand to the contract and
waive all right of action for the fraud. [Emphasis added]
In this respect, the above rationale of Benz v. Zobel would not seem
to apply, as a waiver of the right to recover for the fraudulent conduct
of the vendor, if purchaser's stopping or abandonment of performance
was not reasonably practical, nor where the purchaser was unable to
80
recede from the contract without prejudice.
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soNeas v. Siemens, 10 Wis. 2d 47, 62, 102 N.W. 2d 259, 267 (1960). See Annot.,
13 A.L.R. 2d 807 (1950).

